日本从阪神大地震中学到了什么 Lessons learnt from Kobe quake
Japan’s last big earthquake, which hit the coastal city of Kobe in January 1995, measured 7.3. That was a mere rumble compared with the force that struck off the northern coast of Japan on Friday. Yet by the time the bodies had been counted, almost 6,500 people were dead. | 日本上一次大地震发生在1995年1月，当时地震摧毁了沿海城市神户，震级为里氏7.3级。虽然与本周五袭击日本北部海域地震的能量相比，阪神大地震充其量不过是一阵惊雷，但在统计死难者遗体时，却发现有6500人丧生。 |
The earthquake that hit Kobe, a city of 1.4m in central Japan, struck at 5.46am while most people were still asleep. About 5,000 people died in the first few seconds of the quake, crushed by buildings that Japanese engineers were amazed – and ashamed – to see crumple like cards. It is thought that most of the thousands of buildings that collapsed were built before 1981, when building standards were tightened. | 神户位于日本中部，有140万人口。地震来袭时是凌晨5:46，大多数人都还在梦中。约有5000人在地震发生后的几秒钟内就被建筑物砸死——见到建筑物像纸片一样坍塌时，日本工程师既惊且愧。据信，数以千计的倒塌建筑物中，有许多是1981年建筑标准提高之前建造的。 |
Nevertheless, the timing of the quake is thought to have saved lives because more may well have died had they been hit by falling masonry or trapped in some of the high-rise buildings that toppled over. | 不过，人们普遍认为，那次地震发生的时间可能也拯救了许多生命，因为如果高层建筑倾覆，被石砖砸死或困在废墟中死去的人数可能更多。 |
The Hanshin expressway, a supposed showcase of modern engineering, also collapsed. Reclaimed land around the port city turned to mulch because of the vibrations, causing some tall buildings to collapse. | 被视为现代工程样板的阪神高速路(Hanshin Expressway)也坍塌了。神户周边人工填海的土地受到震动，像朽叶一样松软，导致一些高层建筑倒塌。 |
More casualties resulted from the fires that raged uncontrollably through the city afterwards. Japanese rescue authorities, impeded by damaged roads and inadequate preparation, were blamed at the time for being slow to douse the fires, some of which raged for days. Unlike in Friday’s earthquake, there was no significant tsunami damage. | 震后燃起了大火，火势凶猛无法控制，造成了更多伤亡。日本救援部门因道路损毁受阻，加之准备不足，当时被批评救火反应迟缓，某些地区的火势甚至蔓延数日。与本周五的地震不同，当时并没有严重的海啸损失。 |
The government’s response to the Kobe earthquake was chaotic. A cabinet meeting that morning was told that a quake had hit the ancient city of Kyoto – 50 miles from the actual scene. Communications collapsed and more accurate information trickled out only slowly. | 日本政府在应对阪神大地震时一片混乱。当天上午召开内阁会议时，内阁收到的报告称，古城京都发生了地震——而京都距离实际震中尚有50英里。通讯陷入瘫痪，更为准确的信息拖延很久才一点点地传出来。 |
Unlike in the latest quake, politicians dithered over whether to call in the Self Defence Forces because of pacifist antipathy towards the military. Members of the Yamaguchi-gumi, the notorious crime syndicate that has its headquarters in Kobe, won much acclaim by often arriving first at the scene to hand out food, blankets and water. | 与此次地震不同，阪神大地震时，奉行和平主义的日本政府官员对军队持反感态度，对是否向自卫队求助犹豫不决。臭名昭著的犯罪团伙山口组(Yamaguchi-gumi)总部位于神户，山口组成员往往率先抵达受灾现场，分发食物、毛毯和水，因此颇受赞誉。 |
“The [local] public sector was not prepared, the people were not prepared and the national government was even worse,” said Yoshinobu Fukusawa of Kobe’s disaster reduction institution in 2005 on the 10th anniversary of the quake. By the looks of it, the state apparatus has responded much more quickly this time. | 神户减灾机构的Yoshinobu Fukusawa曾在2005年阪神大地震10周年时表示：“（本地）公共部门没有做好准备，民众没有做好准备，中央政府的准备更糟。”就此次地震后的表现来看，国家机关的反应要迅速得多。 |
In Kobe, industry, including giant steel mills, factories and petrochemical plants, shut down. Some businesses never reopened. Others struggled over the next weeks and months to get parts for their manufacturing operations, a logjam that led many to rethink Japan’s famed ‘just-in-time’ system of inventory. | 在神户，包括大型钢厂、工厂和化工厂在内的工业停止了运转。一些企业再也没能重新开张。其它企业在其后数周乃至数月内都难以部分恢复其制造业务，这种困境，让许多人开始反思日本著名的“及时反应”(just-in-time)库存体系。 |
A government estimate put the cost of rebuilding Kobe alone at $250bn. The city has never recovered its status as a thriving metropolis. Within five weeks of the Kobe quake there were 50 big aftershocks. People were scared to return to their homes for weeks. Even years later, some were still living in temporary housing. | 根据日本政府的一项估计，仅神户一地重建成本就高达2500亿美元。神户再也没能重新成为一个繁荣的大都会。在神户地震发生后的5周内，出现了50次较大的余震。连续数周，人们都不敢回家。甚至数年之后，一些人仍生活在临时住房里。 |
译者/何黎 |
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